Dear Friends/Co-sailors,
Sharing below the ECO update from Days Three, Four and Five of
the UNFCCC ADP 2.10
negotiations in Bonn, Germany.
This has been shared with us by Linh over email.
Hope you find it useful.
Thanks and best regards,
Ranjan Panda
Convenor, Combat Climate Change Network, India
Mob: +91-9437050103
Email: ranjanpanda@gmail.com
=============
4th sept – Day 5
Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger
As Wednesday's stocktaking made clear, all Parties agree we
need to do quite a bit of work to get the ambitious, equitable and
comprehensive climate deal the world needs. As one French group (no, not the
incoming Presidency) puts it; we need to work harder, better, faster, stronger.
Progress is needed today to develop constructive bridging
proposals on concepts and text. The challenge is no mean feat; it is an
international agreement we’re trying to get, after all. So the ADP co-chairs,
co-facilitators, and all Parties need to work harder, better and faster to
craft a concise, well-organised text. We'll need a text that is stronger, with
options for a truly ambitious outcome that lets us start real negotiations when
we next meet in Bonn in October.
Over the next six weeks, there are a series of important
political discussions that can inject political momentum into October's
negotiations. These include this coming week's ministerial consultations in
Paris, the September 27th leaders’ climate luncheon in New York, and the early
October finance ministers meeting in Lima.
ECO reminds Parties that we must leave the last ADP meeting
before Paris with a manageable set of textual options on the political issues
ministers will have to resolve
We have full confidence that the Peruvian and French
presidencies will continue building trust and understanding among ministers,
identifying possible resolutions for key issues well before crunch time in
Paris.
If we follow this roadmap, and Parties work intensively in a
spirit of compromise, we can achieve the deal we need in Paris – a hopeful
outcome with avenues to ramp up ambition while safeguarding vulnerable
communities around the world. But there is no more time to lose… and hence the
need for harder, better, faster stronger efforts.
Let’s be clear
Being clear helps better direct policy and allocate
resources appropriately. So ECO also wants to be clear. Paris needs to improve
transparency and accountability on many different fronts: mitigation and
adaptation actions and means of implementation. And to be even clearer, it does
not mean additional burden. And
importantly, improved transparency and accountability will build trust.
Let’s start with guiding principles and rules to count emissions
and preserve environmental integrity of commitments. We also need to assess the
quality of information and scale of countries’ actions, as well as a credible
process to support compliance and effective implementation.
Of course, we're not starting from scratch. Let's build on
the MRV experience of mitigation: measurement (collection of information
domestically), reporting (provision of this information internationally), and
verification (checking by independent experts).
It is critical to track whether the collective effort is
enough to keep emission levels below the 1.5°C warming trajectory that we need
to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.
Sharing information on current or planned domestic laws, standards, or
other enforceable provisions also helps identify where international
cooperation, support, or capacity building might be most helpful.
Without transparency, we cannot understand country pledges,
avoid double-counting of efforts, or facilitate compliance. Unless stakeholders perceive transparency
provisions as fair, with continuous improvement of support, broader
negotiations will stall.
The transparency system must be evolving, flexible and
recognise that Parties are starting from different points and have varying
levels of responsibility and capability.
Flexibility can be framed in terms of scope, level and type of actions,
methodological tiers, and frequency of reporting – all leading to continuous
improvement. It is clear that Parties’
MRV obligations should not be less stringent than in the past or present.
Ahead of Paris, Parties can agree on the objective, scope
and guiding principles, laying the foundation of an enhanced MRV regime that
allows for improvement of data quality, and informs how actions and support can
be scaled up over time. Middle ground
options can then be made clear and detailed work programs enabled in COP decisions
for elaborating and reviewing rules and
guidelines. That way, we can leave Bonn with a clear direction on where we are
going.
Transport Needs to Get Moving
Delegates, are you also hoping that soon you'll be able to
come to Bonn in super-efficient aircraft, helping to solve the problem of
emissions from international aviation? ECO is guessing that the answer is a
resounding: “Yes!”
Unless we take action now, that scenario is looking less and
less likely. A report this week from the International Council on Clean
Transportation has found that fuel-burn efficiency improvements for new
aircraft have fallen to 1.1% per year, against the industry target of 2% per
year. With passenger numbers increasing every year, aviation emissions are expected
to grow by up to 300% by 2050. Yes, you read that right. This would be a huge
blow to our efforts to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) needs
to step up its climate efforts. Parties to ICAO must adopt a meaningful CO2
standard for new aircraft—incredibly, none currently exist—and agree to a
market-based mechanism to close the remaining gap between aircraft efficiency
and passenger growth.
The situation is also dire with international shipping. The
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is refusing to set an emissions
target at all.
The transport sector needs to get moving on mitigation. The
wording in Part III of the co-chairs’ tool on ICAO and IMO taking action to
reduce emissions needs to be firmly placed in the agreement. Otherwise these
sectors risk undermining other efforts to reduce emissions.
Enabling Clarity on “Enabling Environments”
All week, the expression “enabling environments” kept coming
back into use during the finance sessions. Several Parties raised questions
about what it actually means. ECO has a few worries of its own. Since this week
has been about gathering feedback and building convergence, a bit more clarity
on this term needs to be enabled.
Will developing countries need to establish some sort of
“appropriate conditions” in order to attract greater flows of private finance?
And what would those conditions be? Surely countries would not be required to
relax their environmental or labour regulations just to allow the private
sector to extract extra profit. Right?
And would the expansion of “enabling environments” reduce
developed countries’ obligations to provide adequate levels of public climate
finance to support extra action in vulnerable developing countries. Surely not.
These are just some of the questions that strike ECO upon
hearing the echoes of “enabling environments”. It would be both a shame and
slightly ironic if these concerns rang true, making the overall environments
even less enabled to address the needs of affected people, ecosystems(?) and
communities.
ECO totally supports the shift of overall financial flows
and investments away from high-carbon to low-carbon and climate resilient
activity. But that should happen alongside continued provisions of public
finance, part of which is crucial to support ambitious policies and targets,
strong and effective country institutions, and informed and empowered
policymakers and civil society.
Maybe “enabling environments” will turn out to be more than
a buzzword, but this can only happen if negotiators enable an environment for
discussions and clarity on the type of policies, targets and institutions it
should include.
Caring for Land, Securing our Food
Does anyone really question whether land is central to what
we're all trying to do here in the UNFCCC? No, didn’t think so. Not only is the
land sector critical to our mitigation efforts, but one of the key reasons we
so urgently need to stop climate change is to still be able to use it to grow
food and, um, eat, in a few decades' time.
It's obvious that to help us stay below 1.5°C temperature
rise, some types of land must act as sinks and carbon stores. We need to do
everything we can to protect, maintain and restore critical ecosystems such as
natural forests, grasslands and degraded peatlands. Our survival, and most of
the living species we share our planet with, depend on it. In fact, we need the
work on land to come on top of everything else we can do to reduce our
emissions from other sectors, particularly industry and energy. So let’s be
honest; land cannot be used to lower ambition elsewhere.
At the same time, let’s not get carried away in our
enthusiasm for mitigation in the land sector. Countries need to avoid any
perverse incentives that conflict with food production, destroy natural
ecosystems, threaten indigenous peoples' rights, drive land grabs, increase
hunger, harm animal welfare, or make life even tougher for vulnerable
communities. ECO suggests a rather elegant solution: Parties should be as clear
as possible in the text about the kinds of lands and mitigation actions that
should be prioritised, and that peoples’ rights must be protected.
With this in mind, ECO hopes that there will be resounding
support for the Parties that have introduced text to ensure food security and
social and environmental protections into the General Objective of the new
agreement.
Addressing land properly in the new agreement presents an
exciting opportunity to fix the gaps in the old regime, step up ambition, and
protect our future food security. We’re
all hungry for change.
Let’s Get Ethical
FYI: ECO is highly principled, and believes that a key role
of the Paris agreement will be to enshrine durable principles. Specifically for
carbon markets, the following principles should be inscribed:
Real: unless the emissions reductions have actually
occurred, and are not an accountancy trick, what’s the point of a market?
Supplemental: a failure of carbon markets has been the
result of inadequate levels of ambition to drive the market. Only countries
with targets that represent their fair share of effort towards the 1.5oC goal
should be allowed to trade, and then only for levels of ambition above that
fair share.
Additional: any credits that are traded need to represent
emissions reductions achieved above a credible baseline.
Internationally verifiable: for those participating in the
market, confidence in the quality of the credits is paramount. Alas, only
through transparency will this confidence be achieved.
Permanent emissions reductions: having the emissions
reappear at a later date makes the credits a mere accountancy trick.
Avoid double counting: despite getting a Fossil on this,
Brazil still does not understand that this is an issue. Counting a single
credit twice as contributing towards action misses the whole point.
Deliver sustainable development co-benefits: there are many
other environmental, developmental and human rights issues that at worst
credits and markets should not undermine, and at best should actively
contribute to improving.
========
3rd Sept – Day 4
5-year Commitment Periods: Not Just a Teenage Crush
Rumours are circulating that certain Parties have been
shopping a less-than-precise interpretation of EU positions in Bonn.
Apparently, one of the main messages has been that the EU’s proposal for
10-year commitment periods has developed into quite an obsession, with little
chance of recovery. ECO begs to differ.
There is no legislation in place that would hinder the EU’s
adoption of a 5-year commitment period. Even if there is political resistance
from certain corners. ECO has reliable intelligence that several EU member
states actually see the merit in shorter commitment periods, which capture
technological and economic progress, protect against low ambition, and react
more quickly to the increasingly severe consequences of the changing climate.
The EU’s decision on the length of commitment periods will
be made from purely political motives. Everyone knows that political winds
shift as fast as teenage crushes do, though. Champions of 5-year commitment
periods should ramp up the pressure on the EU—the window of opportunity still
stands. Upcoming legislation will make this shift more difficult, so now is the
time to act with swift determination. ECO will be here cheering you on every
step of the way!
Hot Air
With all the puffery at these talks, you’d think a little
more hot air might not be noticed. The problem is, it’s not just a little bit
of hot air, the result is sweltering.
The lack of integrity of the market mechanisms under the
Kyoto Protocol, combined with weak targets, have created an 11 gigatonne CO2e
hot air loophole. That’s right, 11 big ones -- clearing up that loophole would
go a long way to closing the gigatonne gap. One important way would be to agree
the KP hot air credits must be ineligible for compliance in the Paris
agreement.
To ensure that we learn from the KP experience, the Paris
treaty should define principles for the eligibility of use of international
markets to achieve a country’s Nationally Determined Commitment. This should
include how markets should reach standards that deliver real, supplemental,
additional, verifiable, permanent emissions reductions, avoid double counting
of effort, result in a net atmospheric benefit, and deliver sustainable
development co-benefits. These principles will need to be defined in the COP
decisions. Unless the core agreement specifically refers to these
well-established standards, the transparency and environmental integrity of
many Parties’ NDCs that depend on the use of markets cannot be assured.
To be effective, only countries with NDCs expressed as
multi-year carbon budgets should be allowed to use markets for compliance. Such
countries should also only be able to use market mechanisms if they have an
ambitious 2025 mitigation target in line with their fair share 1.5°C target.
Confidence in the carbon markets post 2020 requires rigorous MRV and accounting
of emissions.
As Winston Churchill put it: "Those that fail to learn
from history, are doomed to repeat it." Will we learn from the KP
experience? The agreements you come to, dear delegates, will test whether you
indeed have learned.
Remember the Science: 2°C is Not Safe
When working at a microscopic level, we know there is a
danger of delegates losing perspective. In June, the presentation of the
Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) results saw intensive exchanges on new
science, the impacts of climate change and how to keep warming at 1.5/2°C. But
the end saw Saudi Arabia and others sideline an agreement to inform the ADP on
their work and conclusions.
The SED found that the ‘guardrail’ concept, in which up to
2°C of warming is considered as relatively safe, is in fact inadequate due to
the severe risks and potential irreversible impacts. Instead, the long-term
goal should be defined as a ‘defence line’ and efforts should be made to put
the line as low as possible. It’s important to note that more than 100 Parties
already support limiting warming to 1.5oC, a group only likely to gain members
in the run-up to Paris.
From the 10 key SED messages, ECO wants to reiterate three:
1) Warming of 2°C would lead to catastrophic impacts, slow
down economic growth and hinder poverty reduction efforts considerably.
2) The world is not on track for a path towards a 1.5/2°C
scenario. Past and recent global GHG emissions have accelerated, the emissions
gap is growing, and the current Cancun pledges are more consistent with
pathways limiting global warming to 3-4°C.
3) Keeping warming at 1.5/2°C is still achievable. Deep
emission cuts are needed to keep warming at 1.5°C and below 2°C levels. This
would require full decarbonisation of energy systems. Achieving this would not
significantly affect global gross domestic product growth.
#Ganietinberoep
“If, and this is the case here, there is a high risk of
dangerous climate change with severe and life-threatening consequences for man
and the environment, the State has the obligation to protect its citizens from
it by taking appropriate and effective measures.”
The Hague District Court, 24 June 2015
You can’t have missed it: the Dutch NGO Urgenda, alongside
over 900 citizens, recently won a historic climate lawsuit against the Dutch
state. The Court in The Hague confirmed what scientists, the public and civil
society have long known: developed countries must take more climate action,
now. And if they don't, they face being held legally liable for impacts of
their inaction.
Accordingly, the Court ordered the Dutch government to
reduce its emissions by a minimum of 25% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels,
deeming the current target of 17% wholly inadequate.
And rightly so: for a likely chance of avoiding dangerous
climate change, developed countries must make much bigger cuts to their
greenhouse gas emissions. In mandating a 25% target, the Court expressly
provides a great deal of leeway for the Dutch state, noting that, "a
reduction target of this magnitude is the absolute minimum“.
However, what might have been an opportunity for Dutch
leadership and an ‘orange is the new green’ attitude has instead become a
fossil-worthy fiasco. Earlier this week, the Netherlands announced its
intention to appeal the case—despite numerous protests all pleading
“#ganietinberoep!” (don’t appeal!).
There are strong signals that the government’s main
rationale for the appeal is that it hopes to continue its dirty ways, with less
than 5% of the country powered by renewables and annual fossil fuel subsidies
approaching $10 billion.
With its future adaptation costs estimated in the billions,
this low-lying country should really know better. The Netherlands is just the
first in a long line of countries that could eventually be held legally
accountable for climate inaction and delinquency towards their citizens.
All developed countries must cut their emissions by at least
40% by 2020 from 1990 levels in order to help bridge the emissions gap. The
Urgenda case is an indictment of all who put the priorities of powerful vested
interests above those of their citizens, and a clarion call to the need for
quick and powerful action on climate change.
Towards a Global Goal On Adaptation
With severe climate impacts already harming vulnerable
people and ecosystems, Parties' attention to a global adaptation goal is
essential—and long overdue.
To be strategic, visionary, and durable, a global adaptation
goal should complement an ambitious long-term mitigation goal that limits
global warming to 1.5°C. A global goal should advance adaptation to increase
resiliency to the impacts of climate change. This should be underpinned by
principles, building on those agreed in the Cancun Adaptation Framework. The
pathway to achieve the goal must be dynamic, taking into account increasing
warming, and scaling up disaster risk reduction to minimise residual impacts
and loss and damage.
It must also be underpinned by key mechanisms. First,
gradually and regularly advance an understanding of how countries are managing
current and expected climate risks, and the sufficiency of those efforts.
Countries will need to prepare for the expected level of warming—more than 3°C
due to inadequate INDCs.
Second, regularly assessing needs in terms of support, in
particular financial support based on CBDR+RC. ECO imagines that National
Adaptation Plans, adaptation components of the INDCs, or those included in
National Communications could inform this assessment.
Third, establishing a process for meeting public finance
targets for adaptation by developed countries and others that significantly
reduces the gap between needs and the support provided.
These pillars will require further technical work before the
Paris agreement’s entry into force, in order to develop real value in
addressing adaptation.
An Inconvenient Gap
ECO would like to draw Parties' attention to new analysis
out today: even though only two-thirds of the world's emissions are covered by
currently submitted INDCs, there is a substantial gap in mitigation ambition as
we speed toward Paris. Submissions for 2025 put us on a dangerous track to
warming of well over 1.5°C, and the 2030 goals are simply not good enough. And
the 2030 commitments submitted thus far would make 2°C "essentially
infeasible", and 1.5°C "beyond reach".
Then there's the pesky problem of actually meeting the
commitments put forward so far, let alone any new ones. Only the EU and China
have realistic pathways to meet their 2025 targets. Everyone else needs to step
up their game to ensure stabilisation of the climate.
It's time for countries to take a hard look at global goals
and play their part. ECO has three prescriptions: increased ambition for 2025
targets, 5-year cycles to ensure an opportunity for course correction, and
strong encouragement to increase ambition back home to pass policies in line
with stated commitments.
===========
2nd September - Day 3
Innovative Public Finance: Fruit Ripe For Picking
Many delegates have spent years, inside and outside of this
process, on the seemingly enticing topic of innovative finance. ECO understands
if some of you are getting tired of this work–so now is the time to harvest the
fruits of your labour and lock in new, predictable and significant sources of
finance that aren’t at the whim of treasuries!
The ground has been prepared by studies, such as those of
the High-Level Advisory Group on Finance, the Leading Group on Innovative
Finance, and others who have scoped the landscape.
Trial plantings have been made with a share of proceeds of
the CDM that initially provided funds for the Adaptation Fund. Unfortunately,
this fruit has withered on the vine.
Early seedlings in ICAO and IMO have so far come to
nought–it seems they need UNFCCC fertiliser to grow. And if there’s one thing
the UNFCCC can produce, it’s fertiliser.
Now that the ground has been prepared, and the Paris
agreement is well placed to ensure that, within a year, we are harvesting the
fruits of innovative public finance.
We need only one more ingredient: a process to agree on new
innovative sources of public finance. Paragraph 82 in Part II is a good start,
but should be spliced with the detailed options found in paragraph 54 and
paragraph 64, Part III.
We need to be sure that predictable finance flows into
adaptation, loss and damage, and no-net-incidence are considered, as well as
targeting the drivers of climate change where possible. And then, with some
gardening work in 2016, we will be in a position to enjoy the fruits of our
labour.
It’s the Scale, Stupid
In the endless repetition of long-standing positions that
passes for climate finance negotiation these days, one message comes through
loud and clear: the Paris agreement–yes, the core legal agreement, currently
largely in Part 1 of the co-chairs’ tool–must address the scale of finance to
be provided post-2020.
Failure to do this will undermine trust, contribute to a
lowest-common denominator deal (or even no deal), and bring us closer to the 3
or 4°C-warmer future we all dread.
ECO is well aware of the difficulties: post-2020 is beyond national
budgeting cycles, finance ministries and political leaders must be engaged,
etc., etc.
But let’s move into solutions mode. ECO concedes that firm
numbers will not be in the core agreement. But let’s think about what can go
there. Here is a start:
The US$100 billion-by-2020 commitment will be a floor for
post-2020 finance.
Financial support will be scaled up over the post-2020
period until climate goals are met, and (to pick up on what the EU said
yesterday) the most capable countries will contribute such financial support.
Ex-ante financial targets (aggregate and/or individual
countries) will be agreed on a rolling basis, on a 2- to 5-year cycle.
Mechanisms, provisions or processes to enable developing
countries to identify their needs to enhance action.
Recognition of the catalytic and central role of public
finance, with at least 50% going to adaptation.
Scaled-up finance from multiple sources can be targeted to
enable climate action in a variety of ways, through:
Traditional channels of financial flows,
New financing arrangements for activities with high
mitigation potential identified through Workstream 2 and an ongoing technical
examination and prioritisation process, and
Matching of finance with conditional activities that have
been identified in developing countries’ INDCs.
ECO is convinced that if all the big brains around the
finance table really tried, they could find ways to incorporate these ideas.
This includes finding even better ideas that can provide certainty that
financial resources will be available.
Such certainty is the requisite to unlock the maximum
mitigation and resilience potential in developing countries, by complementing
their own domestic efforts to shift public and private financial flows.
Productive Differentiation Times
ECO has spent years calling for serious discussion on
differentiation, and was pleasantly surprised when, yesterday, one
materialised. Even better, the “spin off” meeting unfolded as a probing
exercise that cast some real and useful light.
The fundamental question – what is the purpose of
differentiation? – saw lots of good answers. One, offered by Mali, was that a
proper differentiation system would ensure that all countries, whatever their
level of development, could make their “best efforts”. ECO wants to add that in
an economically stratified world like ours, a differentiated regime is key to
equity, trust, solidarity, and action.
If the level of effort is nationally determined, one crucial
point – repeatedly noted – is that we must not lose focus on the need for
developed countries to take the lead. Self-differentiation, the theme of
yesterday’s discussion, is what we have to work with. And clearly, we have to
make it work.
The EU said that it never wanted self-differentiation, but
rather a “spectrum of commitments” that takes the complexity of the modern
world into account. Can we reach that same goal by a path other than
self-differentiation? It won’t be easy, but that’s because the only spectrum
currently open is one of nationally determined actions.
Such happy outcomes are possible, but not without
principle-based ex-ante assessment. ECO was a bit taken aback when China went
out of its way to insist that such assessment, and even “common indicators,”
were doomed to lead to “name and shame.”
ECO wonders if naming and shaming is always a bad thing
though. After all, there really are leaders and laggards among us when it comes
to climate action. China helpfully added some perspective to this view
yesterday when it argued that the existing “categories” had not, in fact,
dissuaded the developing countries from voluntarily, and substantively,
increasing their ambition.
On this point, ECO is happy to agree. But this seems to
support the need for a principle-based assessment, one capable of identifying
such ambition where it exists and constructively highlighting where more work
needs to be done.
Bold Words and Empty Promises
The Arctic is one of the regions hit hardest by the climate
change, and on Monday, the US convened the GLACIER summit – Global Leadership
in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and Resilience – to muster
ambition among Arctic Council nations ahead of Paris.
With reluctance from Canada and Russia, a joint statement on
climate change and the Arctic was signed. Notably, it did not commit to any
concrete actions. “We take seriously warnings by scientists,” they said, but
only recommended fossil fuel companies voluntarily join an Arctic methane
mitigation program.
President Obama stressed that not enough was being done.
“This year in Paris has to be the year that the world reaches an agreement.
None of the nations represented here are moving fast enough.” He also added
that: “any so-called leader who does not take this issue seriously or treats it
like a joke — is not fit to lead.”
ECO would like to remind GLACIER countries, now that you
have affirmed your commitment to climate action, it’s time to walk your talk in
Bonn.
Loss and Damage FAQ
ECO is pleased that Parties have started substantive
discussions on the important issue of loss and damage. Equally, ECO is glad to
have been helpful to Parties with our debunking mechanism–as was mentioned in
today’s loss and damage facilitated discussion, which dove into the hard
questions. Key amongst them were:
If we’re creating a durable agreement at Paris, in the
context of available science, how could we justify not including loss and
damage in this durable agreement?
The answer for this question was given in the moving
intervention from Dominica about the devastating impact of Hurricane Erika,
supported by the many references by others to the need for finance for the
impacts of climate change. Zambia also pointed out that the circumstances of vulnerable
countries are likely to be very different in 20 or 50 years–some of these
countries will face existential crises in that time frame. As the Marshall
Islands, the US and others noted, this is an existential question for low lying
countries–and not an end-of-century problem. It is real and urgent , and it is
not going away. Vulnerable countries need certainty and they need permanence
that we will deal with the threats to their existence.
Will developed countries accept loss and damage in the Agreement?
An argument that Parties would accept loss and damage within
the Decision but not the Agreement only serves to reinforce concerns that
developed countries are not treating loss and damage with the seriousness it
deserves. If placing it in the Decision indicates you’re committed to it, then
go all the way and put it in the Agreement. Demonstrate that it is part of our
long-term commitment to dealing with climate change.
Why include loss and damage in the Agreement, when we have
the Warsaw Mechanism?
The mandate for the Warsaw Mechanism is narrow and
contested. Let's remember that developed countries have argued against
including finance for loss and damage in the work plan, despite it being
included in the WIM. Any agreement needs to reflect the latest science and
reality on the ground, requiring a broader and deeper mandate, including a
comprehensive approach to managing risk and comprehensively addressing climate
displacement.
How would the Warsaw Mechanism interact with the Paris
agreement?
The WIM can do important work between now and the
implementation of the Paris agreement, and this should answer some of the
questions that Parties now have. It could also have a role to play in
implementing the functions outlined in the Agreement, while remaining open to
be changed if needed.
And, delegates, remember that ECO is always ready to help if
there are more questions!
WS2: How To Do Better
Constructive proposals have pleasingly been coming out of
the Workstream 2 discussions. Crucial emissions gap language, missing since
June, has been reintroduced. This includes discussions around a forum to move
WS2 towards implementation, improved Technical Experts Meetings, appointment of
champions for actionable initiatives, and a Technical Examination Process on
adaptation, among others.
Efficient systems and processes need to be put in place to
close the ambition gap. It is important that WS2 be enhanced, as it could be a
pilot for future efforts to close the emissions gap left by inadequate INDCs.
ECO appreciates that many Parties recognise the potential of non-state actors
in these processes, too.
However, while this—collaborative actions and actions by
non-state actors—are critical components of closing the emissions gap, they
cannot account for the full 8-10 Gt CO2e gap that is still expected for 2020.
Governments will have to play their part, especially developed countries. ECO
is concerned that some interventions by developed countries, though
constructive in part, consistently avoid the fact that developed countries
should set an example through enhanced domestic action.
Unexplored mitigation potential, as South Africa put it, in
developing countries exists due to lack of access to technology, capacity or
finance. If developed countries are calling for all countries to close the gap,
they must recognise that this will firstly require them to deliver additional
support to unlock the dormant potential.
Agenda 2030 — Share the Love in Paris
ECO is truly enthusiastic about the global sustainable
development agenda: “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development” which received a standing ovation when adopted last month in New
York.
ECO strongly urges negotiators to support the proposal
currently captured in preambular paragraph 33 of section III, which references
the post-2015 agenda, to ensure alignment of the climate and development
processes.
Here is why: Agenda 2030 includes 17 Sustainable Development
Goals. One specifically urges action on climate change and its impacts when
fighting global poverty, inequality and injustice. But, fret not about your
role in the bigger picture, Agenda 2030 also says that the UNFCCC is the primary
intergovernmental forum for negotiating a global response to climate change.
Although these two processes have different starting points,
they both recognise the need to eradicate poverty. Agenda 2030 is the first UN
document of its kind that tells us to look at development and climate together.
It reminds us that the choices we make today when tackling hunger, improving
energy access or building infrastructure will affect mitigation and adaptation
to climate change.
Agenda 2030 calls for these goals to be achieved while
keeping the global average temperature increase below 1.5°C or 2°C. It asks all
UN member states to work collectively through the UNFCCC towards an ambitious
legal outcome, applicable to all Parties and following the CBDR principle.
Both processes must deliver in a coordinated and coherent
manner. The Paris agreement should welcome Agenda 2030’s mitigation and
adaptation targets, and acknowledge the important role that Agenda 2030 will
play in climate outcomes. Turkey already supported the idea on Monday; ECO
hopes that others will follow suit.
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