19-23 October 2015 | Bonn, Germany
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Bonn Climate Change Conference took place in Bonn, Germany, from 19-23
October 2015. The meeting brought together over 2,400 participants,
representing governments, observer organizations and the media, for the
eleventh part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-11).
The Conference, the last in a series of meetings under the
UNFCCC in preparation for the twenty-first session of the Conference of the
Parties (COP 21), scheduled to take place in December 2015, in Paris, France,
aimed to advance negotiations to meet the mandate to adopt “a protocol, another
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention
applicable to all parties,” which is to come into force in 2020.
In their scenario note (ADP.2015.7.InformalNote), ADP
Co-Chairs Ahmed Djoghlaf (Algeria) and Daniel Reifsnyder (US) identified the
objective of the session as intensifying the pace of text-based negotiations
among parties, with a view to preparing the draft Paris climate package for
presentation at the opening of COP 21. They proposed the ADP begin text-based
negotiations on the basis of the text they prepared, including the non-papers
(ADP.2015.8.InformalNote and ADP.2015.9.InformalNote) with draft agreement and
decision text under workstream 1 (2015 agreement), and draft decision text
under workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition).
ADP 2-11 convened throughout the week in spin-off groups to
advance negotiations on specific sections in the agreement and decision text,
and in an open-ended contact group to take stock of progress and discuss issues
not addressed in spin-off groups.
As the meeting closed, parties agreed to forward the revised
non-paper, dated 23 October at 23:30, that captured the work undertaken by
parties at ADP 2-11, to serve as the basis for further negotiations under the
ADP. Parties also requested that the Secretariat prepare a technical paper,
which would identify closely related paragraphs and duplications within sections,
and possible areas for streamlining, without any changes to the content of the
text.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The international political response to climate change began
with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out a legal framework for
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention,
which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 196 parties. In December 1997,
delegates to COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that
committed industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market
economy to achieve emissions reduction targets. These countries, known as Annex
I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six
GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (the first commitment
period), with specific targets varying from country to country. The Kyoto
Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 192 parties.
LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS, 2005-2009: Convening in Montreal,
Canada, in 2005, the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) decided to establish the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Annex I Parties’ Further Commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol (AWG-KP) in accordance with Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated
consideration of Annex I parties’ further commitments at least seven years
before the end of the first commitment period.
In December 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia,
resulted in agreement on the Bali Roadmap on long-term issues. COP 13 adopted
the Bali Action Plan (BAP) and established the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), with a mandate to
focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a
shared vision for long-term cooperative action. Negotiations on Annex I
parties’ further commitments continued under the AWG-KP. The deadline for
concluding the two-track negotiations was in 2009 in Copenhagen.
COPENHAGEN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen,
Denmark, took place in December 2009. The high-profile event was marked by
disputes over transparency and process. Late in the evening of 18 December,
these talks resulted in a political agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord,” which
was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate,
delegates ultimately agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, and to
extend the mandates of the negotiating groups until COP 16 and CMP 6 in 2010.
In 2010, over 140 countries indicated support for the Accord. More than 80
countries also provided information on their national mitigation targets or
actions.
CANCUN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico,
took place in December 2010, where parties finalized the Cancun Agreements and
extended the mandates of the two AWGs for another year. Under the Convention
track, Decision 1/CP.16 recognized the need for deep cuts in global emissions
in order to limit the global average temperature rise to 2°C above
pre-industrial levels.
Parties agreed to consider the adequacy of the global
long-term goal during a 2013-2015 review, which would also consider
strengthening the goal, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5°C.
Decision 1/CP.16 also addressed other aspects of mitigation, such as:
measuring, reporting and verification (MRV); and reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of
conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks (REDD+).
The Cancun Agreements also established several new
institutions and processes, including the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the
Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism, which includes the
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(CTCN). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created and designated as an operating
entity of the Convention’s financial mechanism. Under the Protocol track, the
CMP urged Annex I parties to raise the level of ambition of their emission
reductions, and adopted Decision 2/CMP.6 on land use, land-use change and
forestry.
DURBAN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South
Africa, took place in November and December 2011. The Durban outcomes covered a
wide range of topics, notably the agreement to establish a second commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol beginning 2013, a decision on long-term
cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization
of the GCF.
Parties also agreed to launch the ADP with a mandate “to
develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal
force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” The ADP is scheduled to
complete these negotiations no later than 2015, with the new instrument
entering into force in 2020. In addition, the ADP was mandated to explore
actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the 2°C target.
DOHA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took
place in November and December 2012. The conference resulted in a package of decisions,
referred to as the “Doha Climate Gateway.” These included amendments to the
Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period (2013-2020) and
agreement to terminate the AWG-KP’s work. Parties also agreed to terminate the
AWG-LCA and negotiations under the BAP. A number of issues requiring further
consideration were forwarded to the Subsidiary Bodies, such as: the 2013-2015
review of the global goal; developed and developing country mitigation; the
Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms; national adaptation plans; MRV; market
and non-market mechanisms; and REDD+.
WARSAW: The UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland,
took place in November 2013. Negotiations focused on the implementation of
agreements reached at previous meetings, including pursuing the work of the
ADP. The meeting adopted an ADP decision that, inter alia, invites parties to
initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally
determined contributions (INDCs). Parties also adopted a decision establishing
the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate
Change Impacts (WIM), and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, comprising seven
decisions on REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements and methodological
issues.
LIMA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, took
place in December 2014. Negotiations in Lima focused on outcomes under the ADP
necessary to advance toward an agreement at COP 21 in Paris in 2015, including
elaboration of the information and process for submission of INDCs as early as
possible in 2015, and progress on elements of a draft negotiating text.
Following lengthy negotiations, COP 20 adopted the “Lima
Call for Climate Action,” which sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015
agreement, including the process for submitting and reviewing INDCs. The
decision also addresses enhancing pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted 19
decisions, 17 under the COP and two under the CMP that, inter alia: help
operationalize the WIM; establish the Lima work programme on gender; and adopt
the Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising.
The Lima Conference was able to lay the groundwork for Paris
by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft negotiating
text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on INDCs, including their
scope, upfront information, and steps to be taken by the Secretariat after
their submission.
ADP 2-8: ADP 2-8 took place in February 2015, in Geneva,
Switzerland. The objective of the session, as mandated by COP 20, was to
develop the negotiating text based on the elements for a draft negotiating text
annexed to Decision 1/CP.20 (Lima Call for Climate Action). The Geneva
negotiating text (GNT) adopted at ADP 2-8 serves as the basis for the
negotiations of the 2015 agreement.
ADP 2-9: ADP 2-9 convened in June 2015 in Bonn and undertook
streamlining and consolidation, clustering and conceptual discussions of the
GNT, including on: preamble; general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss
and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building;
transparency; timeframes; implementation and compliance; and procedural and
institutional provisions. The ADP also discussed workstream 2, in particular
its mandate, and proposed elements that could comprise a decision on workstream
2. The Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) on energy efficiency in urban
environments and renewable energy supply also convened.
ADP 2-10: ADP 2-10 convened in August-September 2015 in
Bonn, Germany. To guide the work, the ADP Co-Chairs produced, at the request of
parties, a “Tool” based on the streamlined and consolidated text resulting from
ADP 2-9. Delegates engaged on various parts of the Tool in facilitated groups
and “spin-offs,” or informal meetings of the facilitated groups. The groups
considered placement of paragraphs in the Tool, engaged in conceptual
discussions on key issues, and, in some cases, started developing textual
proposals. The ADP Co-Chairs were mandated to produce a revised non-paper to
serve as the basis for further negotiations.
ADP 2-11 REPORT
On Monday, 19 October, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder opened ADP
2-11. COP 20/CMP 10 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, Minister of Environment,
Peru, via video message, suggested parties take advantage of previous work and
engage constructively to develop consensus text.
For the COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency, Laurence Tubiana, France,
commended the ADP Co-Chairs for their work on the non-paper. She noted the
non-paper still lacks ambition and called on parties to produce a clear,
concise and ambitious text.
Acknowledging lack of consensus on the non-paper, ADP
Co-Chair Reifsnyder reminded delegates that the ADP Co-Chairs’ non-paper was
intended to serve as the basis for text-based negotiations. Pursuant to a
meeting held on Sunday, 18 October, with Heads of Delegation, he noted an
understanding among parties that work would proceed in a contact group making “surgical
insertions” of “must-haves” into the text followed by a meeting of Heads of
Delegation on how to proceed, as outlined in “Further Clarifications on the
mode of work at ADP 2-11,” distributed as an addition to the ADP Co-Chairs’
scenario note. Parties agreed to continue working under the ADP 2 agenda
(ADP/2013/AGENDA).
South Africa, for the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China),
supported by Sudan, for the African Group, lamented that the ADP Co-Chairs had
not fulfilled their mandate to produce a balanced text. She proposed an
open-ended drafting committee, with text on the screen and live editing, to
address “must-haves.” The ADP open-ended contact group then immediately
convened.
ADP CONTACT GROUP
On Monday, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder opened the contact group,
which responded to the G-77/China’s proposal on how to address omissions in the
ADP Co-Chairs’ non-paper.
Following extensive debate on whether to proceed on the
basis of either the G-77/China or the ADP Co-Chairs’ proposed mode of work,
parties agreed to continue in an open-ended contact group, moving
article-by-article through the text and reflecting proposals submitted by
parties on the screen. In the afternoon and evening, parties put forth their
numerous “surgical insertions” into the non-paper.
On Tuesday, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder proposed using the
revised non-paper as the starting point for negotiations on the Paris package
in closed spin-off groups on: mitigation (Article 3); adaptation, and loss and
damage (Articles 4 and 5); finance (Article 6); technology development and
transfer, and capacity building (Articles 7 and 8); transparency (Article 9);
compliance (Article 11); and workstream 2.
A number of parties noted that their “must-haves” were
omitted but agreed to add these in the spin-off groups, agreeing they would
engage in direct textual negotiations and address associated decision
text.
Noting the importance of transparency, the G-77/China,
Mexico, and Malaysia, for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), opposed
by Japan, called for observers to be allowed to sit in the spin-off groups. ADP
Co-Chair Reifsnyder explained that observers would not be permitted to attend
the spin-off groups, due to concerns posed by some parties.
On Tuesday afternoon, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder explained and
parties agreed that: the revised non-paper issued in the morning, with
“inadvertent omissions” inserted, would be the starting point for negotiations;
the contact group would take up definitions and paragraphs of the draft
decision not assigned to spin-off groups; a daily stocktaking session would
take place; and additional briefings for observers would be scheduled. Parties
agreed that the spin-off group on compliance would also address final clauses
(Articles 12-26). Global stocktake (Article 10) and preamble and
purpose/general (Articles 2 and 2bis) were also assigned to spin-off groups.
The ADP contact group further convened to take stock on
Wednesday morning and Thursday evening, during which spin-off group
co-facilitators reported back on progress in their respective groups. On
Wednesday morning, the contact group addressed items not covered in
spin-offs.
On Thursday evening, following the reports of the
co-facilitators, the G-77/China and Venezuela voiced strong objection that the
stocktaking session had started without the presence of the G-77/China, with
the group wondering whether “their views still matter.” Parties agreed to
reconvene a stocktaking session to consider the way forward on Friday morning.
On Friday morning, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder opened the
stocktaking, which heard reports from Thursday evening’s spin-off groups on:
technology development and transfer, and capacity building; and workstream 2.
ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder suggested that spin-off groups
convene in the morning to continue streamlining text to be submitted for
parties’ consideration ahead of the final stocktaking on the way forward in the
afternoon.
South Africa, for the G-77/China, expressed “profound
dissatisfaction” with Thursday evening’s stocktaking starting in spite of an
ongoing coordination meeting of the G-77/China, calling for the “fair
treatment” of all parties.
Following the final meetings of the spin-off groups, the
contact group reconvened Friday evening to consider the outcome of the session
and discuss the way forward. ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaf announced that in Paris any
spin-off groups established under the ADP will be open to observers, pursuant
to the rules of procedure, unless any party objects.
South Africa, for the G-77/China, welcomed the new text as
balanced and party-owned, but lamented that parties could not complete the
reading of much of the decision text. She proposed that the Secretariat prepare
a technical paper identifying duplication and areas for consolidation,
emphasizing that the integrity of the text must be maintained.
Sudan, for the African Group, noted progress on purpose
(Article 2) in informal consultations, but lamented, with Australia, for the
Umbrella Group, that in other areas parties held to positions and did not
engage in the negotiations.
Underscoring the imminent approach of Hurricane Patricia,
Mexico stressed the urgency of “getting this deal done” and appealed to parties
to put aside differences.
Guatemala, for the Independent Association of Latin America
and the Caribbean (AILAC), congratulated parties for the spirit shown during
the week, noting that this is “the first time we can call the text our own.”
The EU pointed to the text as a basis for negotiation but
stressed progress had not been as fast as hoped and great effort will be needed
to reach an agreement in Paris.
Bahamas also expressed frustration that the sense of urgency
had been lost, stating he had hoped for a more “complete” document to take back
to his capital.
Malaysia, for the LMDCs, stressed that parties now owned the
text, and had restored credibility in the process, and emphasized the importance
of loss and damage, in light of Hurricane Patricia.
Turkey noted the importance of an agreement for future
generations, and called for continued faith in the process and the ADP
Co-Chairs.
Russia said what had taken place this week was not
“negotiating” and called for an additional negotiation session. With Australia,
for the Umbrella Group, he entertained the idea of a new text from the ADP
Co-Chairs.
Parties agreed that the Secretariat would prepare a
technical paper presenting options for streamlining and consolidating the text,
without removing options, and that the non-paper dated 23 October 2015 at
23:30, which corrected minor omissions, would be forwarded to serve as the
basis for negotiations in Paris.
ITEMS NOT COVERED IN SPIN-OFFS: On Wednesday, on
definitions(Article 1), parties said discussions are premature and registered
concerns about terms inserted in the text. The US, Brazil, the Russian
Federation and Bolivia opposed including definitions of “REDD+” and, with
Malaysia, for the LMDCs, of “climate forcers.”
Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, requested a placeholder
for the definition of “climate finance.” Bolivia proposed defining a mechanism
for the implementation of joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the
integral sustainable management of forests as an alternative to REDD+.
Parties also discussed differentiation.
On the draft decision text, Sudan, for the African Group,
suggested brackets around “Agreement” to avoid prejudging the Paris outcome.
China proposed a new title: “Paris implementing agreement under the UNFCCC.”
Parties then discussed issues relating to: the establishment
of an intergovernmental preparatory committee to prepare for entry into force of
the agreement; a placeholder for updating commitments in INDCs before entry
into force; no back-sliding; not limiting contributions to mitigation actions;
and communication on means of implementation (MOI) by developed countries in
their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
SPIN-OFF GROUPS: Preamble and Purpose/General: The spin-off
group on preamble and purpose (Article 2)/general (Article 2bis),
co-facilitated by George Wamukoya (Kenya) and Aya Yoshida (Japan), convened on
Wednesday and Friday.
On Wednesday, parties began discussions on the preamble,
with new text suggestions on, inter alia, “sustainable lifestyles and
sustainable patterns of consumption,” and “the importance of promoting social
and economic development.”
Some parties suggested integrating existing text on: human
rights; the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities; and the special
needs and circumstances of developing countries. Several parties expressed
concern with the mode of work, lamenting “we are still compiling text.”
On purpose, additions to the text were suggested on, inter
alia: long-term goal; sustainable development; response measures; furthering
the objective of the Convention; and national circumstances. Several supported
rethinking the logic of the article to clearly and succinctly express the
purpose of the agreement. Others proposed removing it entirely, stating each
section will address its own purpose.
On Article 2bis, views diverged between those considering it
an essential, separate section; and those who felt the section is not necessary
and overlaps with discussions in other spin-off groups. One party highlighted
nationally-determined time periods for NDCs, as opposed to an
internationally-set timeframe.
Another emphasized the need to refer to INDCs, since
developing country actions are dependent on MOI. One party suggested a
universal legal obligation applicable to all parties that sign the agreement.
Brazil agreed to facilitate informal consultations on the
streamlining of Article 2 and to report back to the spin-off group.
On Friday morning, some parties expressed willingness to
proceed with the new version of the text on the preamble, with a group of
parties presenting bridging proposals from informal meetings.
Some parties expressed procedural concerns, noting that some
insertions had been removed from the text without permission, including on the
rights of people under occupation, and sustainable lifestyles. One party
worried about the “politicized nature” of some insertions.
Other parties cautioned against adding text back in,
encouraging colleagues to work with the text as guidance for further
negotiations alongside the ADP Co-Chairs’ non-paper. One party suggested
presenting two options for the preamble, noting divisions between those wanting
a short, precise text and those wanting a longer one. Several others disagreed,
calling for one single option with brackets. Many expressed confusion over the
use of brackets, stating this was not consistently applied. Co-Facilitator
Wamukoya explained that all text should be viewed as being in brackets, since
nothing was yet agreed.
On Article 2, some parties requested referencing, inter
alia, the integrity of Mother Earth and a just transition of the workforce.
Others noted that the purpose of the agreement should be explained as further
enhancing implementation of the Convention.
Parties forwarded the text to the contact group.
Mitigation: The spin-off group on mitigation (Article 3),
co-facilitated by Franz Perrez (Switzerland) and Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore),
met on Tuesday, twice on Thursday and once on Friday. The group also held
informal informals on Thursday evening.
The group began by inserting elements omitted from the
revised non-paper, followed by paragraph-by-paragraph negotiations. Some
parties presented bridging proposals, but, following difficulties streamlining
the text, Co-Facilitator Perrez proposed continuing structured discussions
based on an outline of concepts included in the text and on timeframes. He
asked parties that had put forward bridging proposals to coordinate amongst
themselves.
On a mitigation goal, a proposal was made that, inter alia:
made the goal a “planetary” one by removing references to types of parties or
special circumstances and common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities (CBDRRC); erased references to poverty eradication,
economic development, zero net emissions and climate neutrality; and replaced
GHGs with “climate forcers.”
Another bridging proposal suggested the peaking of emissions
with different timeframes for developed and developing countries, in accordance
with common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and bearing in mind that
poverty eradication is the overriding priority of developing countries.
On parties’ mitigation contributions, parties identified
core areas, including: differentiation; preparation, communication and
implementation of contributions; their characteristics; type
(contributions/commitments/actions) and legal form; progression and ambition;
design rules or features; the relationship between NDCs and support; and
technical parameters, including timing and housing.
Parties differed on whether the list of upfront information
for NDCs belonged in the agreement text. Several parties stressed addressing
differentiation first, including whether to apply differentiation to all, or
only some, of the identified aspects in the section, and one group suggested
the section begin with text recognizing the principle of CBDRRC.
On timing and accounting/transparency, one party called for
a simple ex ante consideration process and adjustment procedure for increasing
commitments.
On rules and guidance related to accounting, parties
identified “high-level options” with some parties calling for addressing this
under the transparency section of the Paris agreement.
Noting linkages between many different paragraphs, some
parties underscored the difficulty of engaging fully on language before getting
an overview of the section.
On Friday, Co-Facilitator Perrez noted the group followed a
“center-of-gravity” approach to streamlining, noting that countries had worked
together to come up with bridging proposals. He presented new text, prepared on
the basis of discussions.
Parties considered the new text, which clusters issues
around: collective long-term goal; individual efforts; differentiated efforts;
progression; ambition; information; features; timing; subsequent
communications; housing; transparency and reporting; accounting; methods and
guidance; long-term strategies; response measures; unilateral measures;
regional economic integration organizations; collective approaches; support;
framing; international transport emissions; REDD+; and a mechanism to support
sustainable development. Parties made minor editorial changes.
Related to options on nationally determined mitigation
contribution/commitment communication, parties included language on timing.
Several parties queried on the way forward and whether further textual
insertions were opportune. Several parties expressed concern that their issues
had not been captured and that the section overlaps with others. Parties agreed
that the text was a basis for further work, and forwarded it to the contact
group.
Adaptation, and Loss and Damage: The spin-off group on
adaptation (Article 4) and loss and damage (Article 5) and related decision
text, co-facilitated by Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) and Georg Børsting (Norway),
met on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.
On adaptation (Article 4), parties discussed a global
goal/long-term vision, agreeing to remove brackets around “enhancing adaptive
capacity.” One party queried the rationale for including language on
“particularly vulnerable” developing countries in multiple places in the text.
On the links between the level of mitigation and adaptation,
text was added on the resilience of people and livelihoods to abrupt climate
change, mitigation efforts “in line with the provisions/principles of the
Convention,” and the necessity of adaptation irrespective of mitigation. After
consultations and revisions on two options for this paragraph, one party
withdrew its language, saying the balance was restored, and parties agreed to
delete an option.
On human rights and gender responsiveness of adaptation,
delegates considered various textual proposals and agreed to engage bilaterally
to resolve differences. Parties also considered a streamlining proposal on the
approach and guidance for adaptation action.
On the adaptation decision text, parties made insertions
related to regional cooperation, reviewing the coherence and effectiveness of
adaptation institutional arrangements under the Convention, and building on
existing work and processes.
On loss and damage (Article 5), delegates agreed to delete a
paragraph on international cooperation and solidarity.
Another party offered language on institutional
arrangements, saying the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Agreement (CMA) should elaborate the adaptation framework
to enhance its coherence and effectiveness.
One party, opposed by a group of parties, requested adding
“and other parties in need of support” alongside “developing countries”
throughout the text. The issue was resolved with a footnote.
One group expressed concern about “unorthodox” procedures,
calling for delegates to refrain from altering other parties’ suggestions.
Another party suggested issues related to adaptation support be addressed in
the finance spin-off group.
On Friday, parties considered streamlined versions of the
agreement and decision texts. In the agreement text, Co-Facilitator Guerrero
explained where certain language on urgency, vulnerability, capacity building
and technology had been moved in the agreement and corrected omissions and
grammar in response to several parties’ interventions.
Two parties highlighted that human rights was missing on the
approach and guidance for adaptation action and another party expressed concern
that the importance of adaptation being a primarily nationally-driven process
was not adequately reflected.
One group of parties raised concerns about “communication”
being singular and concepts from a deleted paragraph on the approach and
guidance for adaptation action having been lost in streamlined options.
Parties agreed to adjust the text to address these concerns.
On one party’s concern that the language on adequacy of support should be in
the related articles in the agreement, parties placed the marker “(text on
adaptation support to be considered in Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9).”
On the loss and damage agreement text, parties separately
bracketed both options in their entirety.
On the adaptation decision text, parties agreed to bracket
individual paragraphs that introduced new ideas to indicate they are concepts
that parties have not had the opportunity to engage on. Parties also bracketed
“and to use adaptation metrics.”
On the loss and damage decision text, parties separately
bracketed both options in their entirety.
Parties agreed to forward the text as it stood to the
contact group.
Finance: The spin-off group on finance (Article 6),
co-facilitated by Georg Børsting (Norway) and Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and
Barbuda), met on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday.
The group began by addressing omissions and then sought to
clarify options in the draft agreement text. On Wednesday morning, some parties
convened informally to work on streamlining text on institutional arrangements
and considered clarifying ex ante communication. On Thursday, the spin-off
group considered a new iteration of the draft agreement text, as streamlined by
the co-facilitators.
One group of parties emphasized the predictability,
scaling-up of, and access to resources for developing countries, as well as
clarification on finance for adaptation.
One party stressed, inter alia: collective efforts to
mobilize climate-friendly finance, including domestic resource mobilization;
recognition of the role of official development assistance; economic realities;
and that scaled-up finance is not an end in itself. She opposed artificially
limiting the pool of potential donors and restricting the communication on
climate finance to developed countries. In response, another party raised the
issue of the legal nature of some suggestions, noting there was no mandate to
reform the Convention.
Engaging in what some described as a “repetitive”
conversation, parties disagreed on differentiation and on what some referred to
as “changing economic realities.” One group of parties described any notion of
equating developed countries’ obligations with developing countries’ voluntary
efforts as “a non-starter,” stating that such voluntary efforts are not a
reason to dilute CBDRRC or “shift responsibility.”
Some parties called for moving on from this issue,
expressing that convergence on differentiation would not be resolved at this
level, while others stressed that it is the spin-off groups’ responsibility to
engage on these difficult issues in order to present ministers in Paris with a
workable text.
On sources, parties made textual suggestions and considered
merging paragraphs containing ideas on the desirability of a variety of sources
and on public funds, being distinct from official development assistance, as
the main source of financing.
On scale, recognizing the GCF and the scaling-up of climate
finance, one party preferred language showing a progression of efforts rather
than fixed numbers in “a dynamic agreement.”
On balancing support for adaptation and mitigation, one
group of parties stressed the importance of retaining language on the
“fifty-fifty” allocation and a needs-based approach.
Parties continued to examine various paragraphs, making
textual suggestions, clarifying ideas and merging options. A paragraph on a
high-level segment on climate finance was deleted.
Parties also expressed differing views on the dynamism of
the agreement and on specific references to: enabling environments; the role of
domestic resources; and steps to promote the mobilization of climate finance.
On Friday, the spin-off group concluded its discussion of
the streamlined draft agreement text, and moved to consideration of the draft
decision text, with parties making additional textual proposals.
Several parties made textual proposals, including on: ways
to enhance the effectiveness of climate finance; the provision of adequate,
predictable and sustainable financial resources for the implementation of REDD+
activities; and scaling-up the finance base to support developing countries’
climate action.
One group proposed language, inter alia, urging developed
countries to increase the mobilization of financial resources for climate
action of developing country parties to US$70 billion in 2016 and US$85 billion
in 2018, leading to the achievement of the existing commitments to reach US$100
billion in 2020. Noting recent findings of an Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Climate Policy Initiative report, one group
proposed decision language requiring a significant share of new multilateral
funding for climate change action to flow through the financial mechanism of
the Convention and its Protocol.
One party proposed language regarding specification of ex
ante communication, including information on: increased clarity on the expected
levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources; policies,
programmes and priorities; actions and plans to mobilize additional finance;
actions to enhance enabling environments in order to mobilize and attract
climate finance from a variety of sources; and investment plans to implement
NDCs, including financing needs to implement an enhanced level of ambition.
Another group proposed a process to assess progress related
to provision of finance by developed countries, including to ensure: the
balance of resources for adaptation and mitigation; that it is in line with
developing countries’ strategies, priorities and needs; and efforts to improve
adequacy and predictability of resources and avoid double counting.
Parties agreed to transmit the revised text to the contact
group.
Technology Development and Transfer, and Capacity Building:
The spin-off group on technology development and transfer (Article 7), and
capacity building (Article 8), co-facilitated by Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic
Republic of the Congo) and Artur Runge-Metzger (EU), met on Tuesday, Thursday
and Friday.
On technology, the group began by addressing outstanding
omissions before turning to paragraph-by-paragraph negotiations of the
agreement text.
One group of countries opposed specifying that enabling
environments will attract investment, and suggesting reference to investment
“to deploy low-carbon and climate resilient technologies.”
Others differed, saying cooperative action and support for
implementation require improving enabling environments that will “inter alia”
attract investment. Parties’ views also differed on the reference to addressing
barriers to the dissemination and uptake of technology.
On the global goal, one group emphasized that mitigation
ambition can only be met with technology support, and stressed the need for a
technology availability assessment to address the supply side. Others opposed,
stating that quantifying such a goal would be difficult and constitutes a
“disguised commitment.”
On an option on support for research, development and
application of environmentally-sound technologies, one group of parties
expressed opposition, and many suggested addressing the issue at the end of the
section.
On a streamlined version of the purpose of the article
prepared informally by a group of parties, one party called for including
“should” as an alternative to “shall,” since no agreement has yet been reached
on compliance mechanisms of the agreement.
Some called for removing text on “accelerate and upscale,”
while others stated preference for leaving it in the text. The group agreed to
one party’s request to replace the term “gender-sensitive” with
“gender-responsive.”
Reconvening on Friday, Co-Facilitator Mpanu-Mpanu presented
a revised version of the agreement text and the group began considering the
draft decision. Parties clarified where text on intellectual property rights
came from.
One party noted the language requesting the TEC to elaborate
means of strengthening the technology needs assessment (TNA) process might not
be necessary, as the TEC has made more progress than expected in this
area.
Another called for bracketing all instances of the CMA and
any other bodies in the decision text.
One suggested that since the subjects of paragraphs on the
TNA process are on the agenda of COP 21, they can be kept as placeholders
awaiting language from decisions on these issues.
On capacity building, some parties proposed addressing
differentiation on capacity building by singling out specific party groups,
such as least developed countries and small island developing states. Others
proposed to refer only to “parties in need” and to avoid bifurcation.
Having met informally to consider parties’ submissions, the
group considered a streamlined version of several paragraphs. Some parties
expressed concern that ideas had been lost and requested re-insertion of
sections of text. Other parties then expressed frustration with the lack of
progress, calling for parties to accept compromise.
On the way capacity building should be undertaken and who
should support it, parties agreed that the current options provide a basis for
negotiation, and to work informally on institutional arrangements.
On Friday, Co-Facilitator Runge-Metzger noted outcomes of
the informal informals, welcoming their proposed options on institutional
arrangements. On education, training and public awareness (Article 8bis),
parties agreed to keep the language as it is.
On the decision text, one group highlighted their bridging
proposal and noted the need to avoid prejudging the outcome of the third review
of the framework for capacity building, calling for language emphasizing the
need to act upon it. Some expressed concern that they had not had the chance to
add new text on this point, saying they could move forward with the assurance
that they could add it at an appropriate moment.
Parties agreed to forward the text as revised on technology
development and transfer, and capacity building to the contact group.
Transparency: The spin-off group on transparency (Article
9), co-facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore) and Franz Perrez
(Switzerland), convened on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.
The group began by considering parties’ surgical insertions
that had not been included in the text forwarded to the group, and then
discussed the text paragraph-by-paragraph.
On establishing or framing transparency, disagreement arose
on the treatment of differentiation and whether or not to emphasize
bifurcation. Some parties suggested that robustness was the key issue, rather
than differentiation.
Views diverged on the depth of content to include, with some
requesting a brief and simple paragraph and others calling for principles and
greater substance. Parties consulted informally, and developed four clear
options on establishing the transparency system that respectively: emphasize
bifurcation; refer to flexibility without bifurcation; differentiate along three
tiers; and simply establish the transparency system without additional
details.
On a proposal to insert text on a transition period for
developing countries, several parties expressed concern about a defined
timescale, noting that timescales are likely to be different for each party and
that transition is already built into the general framework.
On the purpose of the transparency system, parties noted the
need to define the logic of the paragraph, with essential concepts including:
emissions and removals; progress in both mitigation and adaptation; assessment
and review; and comparability.
Parties disagreed on whether to have separate sections on
action and support, with Co-Facilitator Kwok encouraging consideration of links
between transparency and global stocktake. Some pointed to differences between
adaptation and mitigation, noting MRV of each is differently understood.
Parties agreed that the co-facilitators would give “light treatment” to the
paragraph to reflect the discussions.
On the option to include adaptation, several parties called
for referring to sharing information, lessons learned and good practices,
rather than “achievement.”
Parties disagreed on the content of paragraphs some
described as “reporting and review,” and others “scope and future
arrangements.” At the request of one party, the group agreed to insert a note
in the revised text to indicate this difference in understanding.
Some parties suggested keeping agreement articles brief to
maintain flexibility and allow wide participation, leaving the details in the
decisions or for consideration by the CMA. Others cautioned against this, since
parties “need to know what they are signing up to.”
Discussions on the remainder of the article considered:
specific terminology and potential need for new language for “review” or
“assessment”; cross-cutting issues that could be dealt with in other articles;
the need for technology transfer and capacity building as well as financial
support; and a potential new mechanism for continual support for capacity
building based on the Montreal Protocol.
Meeting on Friday, parties responded to a streamlining
proposal on review/future arrangements, reducing the number of options from
seven to three, with many supporting the revised agreement text as a basis for
further negotiation.
Several parties noted confusion about the mode of work and
way forward, expressing concern that the “compiled” decision text should not
have the same status as the revised agreement text, since there had been no
time to discuss it.
Parties forwarded the text to the contact group.
Global Stocktake: The spin-off group on global stocktake
(Article 10), co-facilitated by Roberto Dondisch (Mexico) and George Wamukoya
(Kenya), met on Wednesday and Friday.
On Wednesday, the group considered the structure and the
logic of the article, and the concepts to be included. On the purpose of the
global stocktake, parties considered, inter alia: its role in assessing
implementation of the agreement and links to objectives of the Convention. Some
parties, opposed by others, requested references to Convention Articles 4.2(d),
7.2(e) and 10.2(a), on the review of aggregate impact, which was opposed by
other groups of parties.
Discussing mitigation, adaptation and MOI as potential focus
areas of the stocktake, parties agreed that the scope should involve at least a
backwards-looking element on implementation. There was disagreement on whether
it should also involve a forward-looking component to inform subsequent
commitment periods, monitoring aggregate contributions against the level of
contributions needed to achieve the objectives of the agreement.
Some parties underscored that the scope should be the global
aggregate of actions taken and not be used to “assess the inadequacy” of
parties’ NDCs. Others suggested that individually collected data might be used
as input into the assessment of the collective efforts, noting the need for a
robust MRV framework.
On Friday, the spin-off group considered a proposal for a
streamlined text, clustered around: purpose and output; scope; process; inputs;
and timing. On the decision text, delegates made insertions on design and
modalities.
Commenting on ways to make cross-references to other
articles in the agreement, delegates agreed to forward the text to the ADP
Co-Chairs.
Compliance and Final Clauses: The spin-off group on
compliance (Article 11) and final clauses (Articles 12-26), co-facilitated by
Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Aya Yoshida (Japan), met on Wednesday,
Thursday and Friday.
On Wednesday, the group collected omitted text insertions in
numerous articles, and discussed options to streamline the text on compliance
and cluster it around headings.
On Thursday, a co-facilitators’ streamlined version of the
text on compliance was presented. Delegates considered further textual
suggestions on numerous articles. On bodies and institutional arrangements to
serve the agreement (Article 15), proposals were made on mechanisms, CMA
decisions, and CMA guidance.
On further requirements and decision-making rights (Article
17), proposals included: a requirement for parties to submit NDCs in order to
be part of the agreement or participate in decision making; the timing and
legally-binding nature of NDCs; a placeholder for a non-punitive compliance
procedure; and reference to general (Article 2bis).
Other text suggestions included: a reference to Annex X in
amendments (Article 19) and at the very end of the agreement; and a placeholder
for reservations in Article 24. On entry into force (Article 18), the UNFCCC
Secretariat informed parties that: the earliest date for opening the treaty for
signature after its adoption in Paris in December would be 22 April 2016; and
they could either use UNFCCC parties’ inventories or datasets used for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report to
determine their shares of GHG emissions. Further discussion on the content and
scope of amendments (Article 19) and annexes (Article 20) took place. Delegates
agreed to continue to work informally.
On Friday, Co-Facilitator Baashan presented, and parties
agreed to forward to the ADP Co-Chairs, three documents: a streamlined
agreement text on compliance (Article 11); a streamlined agreement text on
final clauses (Articles 12-26); and a streamlined decision text.
Workstream 2: The spin-off group on workstream 2,
co-facilitated by Aya Yoshida (Japan) and George Wamukoya (Kenya), met from
Tuesday through Friday, addressing the draft decision
(ADP.2015.9.InformalNote), as revised.
The group began by addressing omissions, before working
through the draft decision paragraph-by-paragraph.
On the preamble and paragraphs on fulfilling previous
agreements and decisions under the Convention, suggested changes included:
enhancing the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention in
accordance with CBDRRC and with developed countries taking the lead; ensuring
applicability to all parties; increasing ambition on existing pre-2020
commitments/pledges; encouraging non-Annex I parties that have not done so to submit
their biennial update report; and conducting a 2016-2017 review of developed
countries’ mitigation commitments and support for developing countries.
A party proposed deleting language on timely participation
in transparency processes and instead adding “in order to demonstrate progress
in the implementation of the mitigation measures” and the implementation of
pledges under the Cancun Agreements.
On voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions
(CERs), suggestions included mentioning quantified emission reductions that are
not limited to CERs, and all flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
Having consulted with “many parties,” one party proposed streamlining related
to voluntary cancellation of CERs, emission reduction units, assigned amount
units and removal units. Another party cited concerns, asking for the text to
be bracketed.
On strengthening the Technical Examination Process (TEP),
parties added language on: encouraging the entities of the financial mechanism
of the Convention to engage in the TEMs to enhance the effective coordination
and provision of support; providing support for the transfer of
environmentally-sound technologies; and assessing the implementation of the
Convention’s provisions regarding the negative social and economic impacts of
response measures.
On an adaptation TEP, the co-facilitators agreed discussions
would take place on Wednesday to allow for adaptation experts’ participation.
Several parties feared this would set a precedent, noting discussions on mitigation
under workstream 2 have not required mitigation experts to be present.
Juan Pablo Hoffmaister (Bolivia), Adaptation Committee
Co-Chair, answered questions on: how the Committee provides technical support
and guidance; gaps to be filled; the utility of a bottom-up approach; whether
the Committee carries out activities similar to the TEMs; and whether its
mandate includes assessment of how to enhance adaptation activities.
Many developed countries opposed addressing adaptation under
workstream 2, calling for: using existing resources and institutions
effectively, such as the CTCN, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, and
the Adaptation Committee; considering elements of the proposed TEP in
discussions on workstream 1 decision text; and encouraging engagement by
countries on adaptation agenda items in other bodies.
Developing country parties emphasized the “crucial” nature
of adaptation, noting: the need to inject a sense of urgency; the workstream 2
mandate mentions adaptation co-benefits; adaptation is a matter of survival and
deserves parity with mitigation; and a need for high-level engagement.
Presenting a streamlining proposal, one group of parties
explained that the adaptation TEP would avoid duplicating other efforts under
the Convention and create linkages and coherence.
On urging parties to ratify the Doha Amendment, some
suggested removing “and wish to do so,” but another indicated this is a
sensitive issue and the wording should remain.
On Friday, parties reviewed the document incorporating all
streamlining proposals. With the re-insertion of a review of implementation
gaps in developed countries’ mitigation commitments in the support section, and
the integration of an alternative option on the TEP in the adaptation section,
parties agreed to send the streamlined version of the text to the contact
group.
CLOSING PLENARY
On Friday evening, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder thanked parties
for their hard work throughout the week.
Jorge Voto-Bernales, for the COP 20/CMP 10 Presidency, Peru,
said the resulting text is not good enough and, in order to transform the text
into a legal agreement, parties must find appropriate procedures and modalities
to increase the effectiveness of the negotiations.
Laurence Tubiana, for the incoming COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency,
called for a shared sense of responsibility, asking parties to find the spirit
of compromise.
ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder proposed and parties agreed to
accept the proposal from the G-77/China on the way forward, including
preparation of a technical paper by the Secretariat identifying closely related
paragraphs and duplications within sections, and possible areas for
streamlining, without changing the content of the text, and forwarding the
revised non-paper from 23 October, with minor changes to rectify omissions, to
the resumed second session of the ADP at COP 21.
ADP Rapporteur Yang Liu (China) presented, and parties
adopted, the report of the session (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.4). ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder
suspended ADP 2 at 7:42 pm.
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF ADP 2-11
“Nobody said it was
easy
It’s such a shame for us to part
Nobody said it was easy
No one ever said it would be this hard
Oh, take me back to the start”
–The Scientist, Coldplay
When delegates departed from the previous session of the ADP
in August 2015, they were buoyed by the prospect of a Co-Chairs’ negotiating
text that could serve as the basis for work on the Paris package. In fact, the
ADP Co-Chairs were expected to relieve parties of the painful prospect of
crafting an agreement from the sizeable text remaining on the table. However,
when parties returned to Bonn six weeks later for ADP 2-11, they were in a
considerably less hopeful frame of mind, following release of a Co-Chairs’ text
that many found unbalanced and unacceptable as a basis for further
negotiations.
This session was supposed to intensify the pace of
text-based negotiations so that the agreement will be ready for the Paris
Climate Change Conference in five-weeks’ time. By the end of the week, however,
it was clear that parties had not managed to intensify the pace. If anything,
they had slowed it down.
Dissatisfied with the ADP Co-Chairs’ text, parties engaged
in a text re-compilation exercise, followed by a painstaking process of
streamlining and clustering. Many of the compromises reached at the June and
August-September sessions of the ADP disappeared, as parties returned to
positions expressed in Geneva in February 2015.
This brief analysis will reflect on ADP 2-11 and on what it
managed to achieve, as well as where it leaves parties on the way to
Paris.
NOBODY SAID IT WAS EASY
Before delegates arrived in Bonn, the Co-Chairs, as
expressed in their scenario note, had hoped to conduct a first reading of the
negotiating text in open-ended drafting committees. The bulk of the negotiating
work was to be assigned to spin-off groups chaired by the facilitators
designated at ADP 2-9 in June. However, dissatisfaction with the negotiating
text disrupted the plan.
The ADP Co-Chairs’ “non-paper” prepared ahead of ADP 2-11
contained a draft text for the Paris agreement and draft decisions on the
agreement and on pre-2020 ambition. The non-paper was based on the 90-page
Geneva negotiating text adopted at ADP 2-8 in February 2015, taking into
account the views and positions expressed by parties over the past eight
months. The Co-Chairs’ non-paper effectively reduced the Geneva negotiating
text to 20 pages: nine pages on a draft agreement text, structured in 26 articles;
and 11 pages on a draft decision comprising both workstreams 1 and 2. However,
some parties felt that rather than focusing on earlier found convergences and
bridging proposals emerging from ADP 2-10, the draft agreement in the non-paper
left a large number of crucial substantive decisions to be made after Paris, or
simply “forgotten.”
As a result, ADP 2-11 began in an atmosphere of trepidation.
Many were anxious to see how the ADP Co-Chairs’ non-paper would be received,
given that some parties had already characterized it as a “non-starter.” In
spite of its brevity, some had hoped that this text would provide a framework
for focused negotiations. Instead, as one observer noted, the Co-Chairs’ text
caused parties to lose faith that their issues would even be considered.
Several parties suggested the text was a trade-off, achieving both clarity and
conciseness at the expense of comprehensiveness, the “hallmark of party
ownership.” But not all parties were willing to work on the basis of the
Co-Chairs’ text. To restore party ownership of what many considered an
“unbalanced” text, delegates engaged in a complex re-compilation operation.
GOING BACK TO THE START?
Even though parties agreed to make only essential “surgical
insertions” into the Co-Chairs’ text, many used the compilation process as a
means to re-introduce their long-held positions into the text. Several
observers noted that the compiled text reversed compromises achieved at ADP 2-9
and 10, reverting to the positions enshrined in the Geneva negotiating text,
saying “it is as if ADP 2-9 and 10 never happened.”
The outcome of this process was a significantly swelled
negotiating text, comprising a 31-page draft agreement and 20-page draft
decision text on workstream 1, both with multiple options and a wide range of
contrasting ideas. The text on workstream 2 was included in a separate
eight-page document.
At ADP 2-11 parties did not make the shift from compilation,
streamlining and consolidation, to actual text negotiations. So while many
welcomed the restoration of parties’ ownership of the text, even more worried
that delegates in Paris had been saddled with an impossible task.
Others emphasized, as a tangible outcome from ADP 2-11, that
the structure of the agreement remained largely unchanged from the Co-Chairs’
non-paper. “It may seem like a small detail,” said one observer, “but the bones
of the agreement are in place regardless of how much flesh was added.” Even
though the text leaving ADP 2-11 is much shorter and better organized than the
Geneva negotiating text, all agreed that it was far from a good basis for
negotiations in Paris.
The troubles of ADP 2-11, however, were not limited to the
swelling of the negotiating text and to the loss of consensus capital. The
meeting was also characterized by a high degree of procedural wrangling.
Parties struggled to agree on a mode of work that would rebuild trust in the
Co-Chairs, the process and the text, and sufficiently increase the pace. But
with as many as nine spin-off groups considering different elements of the
text, several lamented that the fragmentation of the negotiating process had
made it increasingly hard to see the big picture. Even at ADP 2-10, some
parties had raised concern that the fragmented mode of work in spin-off groups
needed to be adjusted so to provide “more centralized” negotiating space.
Throughout ADP 2-11, views differed on whether, at this stage of the
negotiations, spin-off groups are an effective means to work towards the Paris
agreement.
Transparency was another area of contention. In spite of
some parties’ pleas, the spin-off groups were closed to observers. This left
many disgruntled civil society representatives at the conference site venting
their frustration through social media. Some suggested the “secretive approach”
could not be justified, recalling that the Kyoto Protocol had largely been
negotiated in a plenary setting and that civil society plays an important role
in assessing progress, holding parties accountable and in assisting parties in
the negotiation process. It was finally agreed that this would be rectified at
the ADP session in Paris, with observers allowed into spin-off groups unless a
party objects.
NO ONE EVER SAID IT WOULD BE THIS HARD
Leaving ADP 2-11, many delegates concurred with Laurence
Tubiana, who spoke for the incoming COP 21 Presidency, that the text produced
at this session was far from what parties had hoped to have in their hands
ahead of negotiations in Paris. Some feared that, having failed to capitalize
on the momentum of earlier sessions, focus would now shift to less transparent
political, rather than text-based, negotiations.
It is increasingly important for the political level to
provide guidance to the technical negotiations, by identifying political
trade-offs and crafting compromises, as technical negotiations have clearly
struggled to pave the way forward. Yet many in the text-based negotiations
worry that the political level has less experience with the technical
intricacies of the process and may trade off hard won compromises if they end
up having the craft the final agreement themselves.
Fearing turbulence ahead, in the closing hours in Bonn
delegates explored possible pathways to Paris. Most parties did not support
mandating the ADP Co-Chairs to engage in another revision of the text,
preferring to retain their regained ownership. Parties decided instead to
request the Secretariat to prepare a technical paper that would identify
duplications and streamlining opportunities, “without changing the content of
the text.”
How parties will work on this text in Paris, amidst Heads of
State and ministerial engagement, remains to be seen. While Heads of State have
only been invited to a brief session in advance of COP 21, some wondered
whether as “ministers come in, negotiators will have to go out.” Sentiments at
ADP 2-11, however, was that political will still exists to reach a deal in
Paris, but how ambitious the deal will be, and whether it will be ready for
implementation remains in question.
Almost no time at ADP 2-11 was spent addressing the decision
text necessary to flesh out the hoped-for concise agreement. The Paris package
is meant to constitute of both agreement and decision text. Some had hoped for
a virtuous cycle in which the details on the “how” would be captured in
decision text, thus allowing the agreement only to focus on the “what,” with
parties able to make compromises within the agreement text, once assurances on
how issues were being dealt with in the decision text were elaborated. Instead,
at ADP 2-11 a vicious cycle continued to inhibit progress, as parties were
loath to remove anything from the agreement without knowing what would be in
the decision text, but also found it difficult to work on decisions without
knowing what would be in the agreement.
Delegates were painfully reminded of the urgency for an ambitious
agreement in the closing moments of ADP 2-11. Reporting that Hurricane Patricia
was about to hit its coastline with unprecedented strength, Mexico, described
the government’s desperate work to move coastal populations out of harm and
made an emotional appeal for all parties to set aside their differences and
focus on the work ahead. While delegates expressed solidarity with the affected
populations, many in the room reflected on the increasing chasm between the
international climate policy-making process and the mounting real-world impacts
of a changing climate.
Leaving Bonn 20 years after the adoption of the Berlin
Mandate for the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, and ten years since its
entry into force, parties to the climate regime are still struggling to find a
clear path to address the greatest challenge to ever face humankind. The Paris
Climate Change Conference is supposed to light the way for governments to
finally deliver an effective global response to this epochal challenge. ADP
2-11, however, demonstrated that parties remain far from reaching any
agreement. They now have but five weeks to consider their options ahead of
Paris, including opportunities to engage at the political level at the pre-COP
convening from 8-10 November, in Paris, France. During the closing plenary, the
French presidency urged parties to prepare for Paris “using all possible
consultations that they can create among themselves.” As one seasoned observer
noted “turbulence is more of a problem when you are coming in for a landing.”
One can hope that, despite a bumpy ride, the process will find a safe landing
on a Paris agreement.
Source: Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD. Volume 12 Number 651 | Monday, 26 October 2015
